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Abstract 
Are autocratic leaders accountable to any constituencies? Does fiscal transparency play a role in 
relation to accountability? Simply put, do authoritarian executives have to “show the bill” of taxes 
raised and expenditure allocated to their political coalition of support in order to stay in power? What 
are the dimensions of transparency that matter? The main hypothesis is that the impact of transparency 
on autocratic accountability depends on the costs and benefits of the fiscal contract perceived by a 
pivotal constituency – the middle class. In one-party and personalistic regimes where this group is not 
incorporated into the network of privileges, being transparent about its high costs but low redeemable 
benefits endangers regime survival. By contrast, autocratic regimes with limited multiparty 
competition that include the middle class into their coalitions of support are more likely to be 
transparent about the fiscal costs and benefits of investment in regime longevity. This openness 
translates into accountability, since autocratic leaders who do not enact it have, on average, a shorter 
political tenure. I use cross-national measures of fiscal transparency and test the theoretical 
implications with several survival models of political tenure in autocracies across time and space.  
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 1 
1. Introduction 
Are autocratic leaders accountable to some constituencies? Does fiscal transparency play a role in 
relation to accountability? Simply put, do authoritarian executives have to “show the bill” of taxes 
raised and expenditure allocated to their political coalition of support in order to stay in power? What 
are the dimensions of transparency that matter? This paper takes up the task of finding the answers to 
these questions. I argue that transparency is a major ingredient of the relationship of accountability 
between non-democratic executives and their coalitions. Additionally, the size and composition of the 
coalition of support determine the type of taxes and spending submitted to scrutiny. 
The paper brings together two streams – leadership survival and an emerging body of work on 
the determinants of fiscal transparency – to propose a new theory. The main hypothesis is that the 
impact of transparency on autocratic accountability depends on the costs and benefits of the fiscal 
contract perceived by a pivotal constituency – the middle class. In one-party and personalistic regimes, 
where this group is not incorporated within the network of privileges, being transparent about its high 
costs but low redeemable benefits endangers regime survival. This is an equilibrium in which a lack of 
transparency leads to no accountability. By contrast, autocratic regimes with limited multiparty 
competition that include the middle class, or part of it, into their coalitions of support are more likely 
to be transparent about the fiscal costs and benefits of investment in regime survival. This openness 
translates into accountability, since autocratic leaders who do not enact it have, on average, a shorter 
political tenure. 
Empirically, a direct answer to these questions and a theory test are difficult, if not impossible, 
to obtain, as they would hinge upon a self-assessment of strategies of rule at the highest political 
levels. Data collection efforts on the political survival of leaders render an indirect answer somewhat 
feasible.  
Since, according to my theory, fiscal policy transparency is a core survival strategy for the 
executive, I test three main hypotheses with a Weibul survival model of leader’s tenure as a function 
of tax and expenditure transparency and structure for 128 countries between 1972 and 2001. The 
statistical model confirms the theoretical intuitions. Its findings suggest that indeed, on average, 
political executives in autocratic multiparty regimes stay in office longer if they are open about the 
taxes and categories of spending that affect directly the elites and the middle class as a pivotal 
coalition member. In contrast, one-party regimes are less likely to survive if they publicize unfair or 
uncertain fiscal deals for the middle class.   
The paper is in five parts. The first section reviews the two bodies of literature relevant to this 
project. The second section presents the theory and formulates the hypotheses. The third subsection 
discusses the data used for the empirical tests. The concluding section summarizes the main empirical 
findings.   
 
2. Autocratic Survival and Fiscal Transparency – The State of the Debate 
International relations scholars testing theories of autocratic survival tend to be more concerned with 
the relationship between conflict and the duration of the political mandate, or with the impact of 
economic sanctions on institutional persistence, rather than with the political and economic factors 
characterizing the mechanics of survival (Chiozza and Goemans 2004, Marinov 2005).  
In the comparative politics literature, Bienen and van de Walle (1991), Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (2003), and Svolik (2009) tested the duration of tenure for both non-democratic and democratic 
leaders. Bienen and van de Walle, for example, analyzed the impact of individual leader and country 
characteristics on survival. In their account, country characteristics such as the level of GDP per capita 
and the intensity of the ethnic conflict are predictors of duration.  
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) developed formal models in order to explain the institutional 
dynamics of power in non-democracies, based on the ratio of the winning coalition in the selectorate. 
Svolik elaborated on the government dynamic in authoritarian regimes (2009), and argued for an 
institutional theory of survival, contending that duration in office is a result of the bargaining game 
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between the leader who has the power to alter the size of the elite, and the ruling elite who can 
credibly threaten the leader with a coup if s/he behaves opportunistically.  
One of the most influential theoretical attempts to reopen the Pandora’s box of authoritarian 
politics is Bueno de Mesquita et al’s Logic of Political Survival (2003) (henceforth BBM et al.). The 
authors’ institutional theory of minimum winning coalition and its size relative to the selectorate 
deconstructs the conventional dichotomy of democracy/non-democracy and replaces it with a 
theoretically meaningful institutional dimension. In a rather similar institutional vein, Gandhi and 
Przeworski (2007) look at the political institutions of dictatorships and argue that they matter for non-
democratic resilience, by providing a forum for cooptation or cooperation of the potential opposition.  
Gandhi (2008) also estimated the impact of seemingly democratic institutions on autocratic tenure, and 
found a strong and statistically significant effect.  
Despite recent interest in questions of authoritarian leader survival, so far there have been 
surprisingly few attempts to test empirically the effect of fiscal policies with distributive consequences 
on the length of political tenure.  This paper operates with the assumption that time horizons are 
endogenous to strategic choices executives make and their implications for the constituencies of 
support.  
Why should we care about the distributive effects of fiscal policies, their transparency and 
their relationship to accountability?1 Citizen access to decisions, institutions and data about the way 
governments raise taxes and allocate public spending is a necessary condition for accountability in 
robust democracies. The more data on the state coffers that are available, the more robust the checks 
and balances acting against abusive rent extraction and spending. Lack of information among voters 
can significantly reduce the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms. Additionally, trustworthy 
politicians are more likely to select themselves into the electoral process in contexts with more 
informed voters and transparency.  However, even in democratic regimes the chain between 
transparency and accountability is long and full of peril. More so, in authoritarian polities these 
questions might seem futile. Executives rarely give up political power and a lack of transparency is the 
rule of the game. Recent studies have shown that democracies release significantly more information 
on economic policies and outcomes, as politicians have to demonstrate some level of performance in 
office before elections (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland 2011; Wehner and de Renzio 2013).  
I argue that there are forms of transparency-induced accountability in autocracies, even though 
they do not take the shapes and forms one would immediately recognize from democratic politics. 
Since leaders in non-democracies cannot often be replaced at the voting booth, the duration of political 
tenure serves as an adequate proxy for their failure to satisfy or to be accountable to a coalition of 
political support. Knowing that transparency of fiscal policies is a precondition of accountability, it is 
worth asking what kind of “bills” authoritarian governments have to show in order to garner political 
support and to whom. This paper investigates the types of transparency that make authoritarian leaders 
accountable to certain constituencies. Because it is notoriously difficult to measure fiscal transparency 
across space and time, Section 4 discusses concept measurement and the data used in some level of 
detail. 
 
3. Theory 
Building on the literature on the political survival of autocrats (Ames 1987; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003), I assume that leaders want to stay in office as long as possible. To this purpose, they craft 
policies to reward coalitions of supporters and punish opponents. While the policies that can be used 
as weapons for survival are numerous, taxation and expenditure have long been identified as key. 
Politicians reward and punish through the two sides of the budget. Therefore, fiscal politics inherently 
lies at the core of political survival. The central theoretical question seeks the concrete mechanisms 
that convert budgetary politics into political capital for the executive. More specifically, how do 
autocratic leaders convey to their coalition of support that they have fulfilled their part of the deal? In 
other words, do they strive to be accountable to some constituencies at all? Are they successful? 
                                                     
1 Fiscal transparency is usually defined as being open to the public about the structure and functions of government, fiscal 
policy intentions, public sector accounts, and fiscal projections along the entire budget cycle (Kopits and Craig 1998, 1). 
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I argue that the size and composition of the coalition of support are crucial for fiscal 
transparency strategies in authoritarianism. One-party or highly personalistic regimes centered around 
the leader and her family imply a narrow constituency whose fiscal interests must be satisfied. This is 
usually the case of relatively few high-level elites and regime cronies. In a zero-sum distributive game, 
in such polities, the middle class is sacrificed, since it is excluded from the patronage benefits at the 
top, but partakes fully in its costs. Any disclosure of unfair or uncertain high cost/low benefit balances 
can harm the regime politically, since the middle class has mobilization potential.  
Social security and consumption taxes are two examples that illustrate the perceived 
uncertainty, respectively unfairness of the fiscal contract. Whereas the adoption of social security 
programs has been historically more common in autocracies than democracies precisely as a 
compromise meant to postpone or preempt full blown democratization attempts, their proper 
functioning depends on a stable or relatively predictable stream of redeemable benefits. Whereas 
democracies have institutional checks and balances in place that prevent the executive from abusively 
depleting these resources, autocrats cannot credibly commit that they will not use social security funds 
to fund other economic or political priorities. This institutional feature renders any fiscal stream whose 
benefits are redeemable in the future, but whose costs are incurred in the present period uncertain. 
Consumption taxes illustrate the unfair side of fiscal deals because of their regressive nature.  
In Ben Ali’s Tunisia, one of the most repressive political regimes in the Middle East and 
North Africa, the Social Security Office for the private sector (Caisse Nationale de la Securite Sociale 
– CNSS) and the VAT tax authority used to be considered the most efficient units of state bureaucracy. 
Unlike other administrative units, CNSS could bypass courts and enforce decisions against employers 
who failed to contribute. By 2006, however, most economic actors in Tunisia considered social 
security contributions a de facto fiscal tool, because the level of strictly enforced contributions was 
much higher than the level of redeemable benefits (Hibou 2006, 164). In general, by the time of the 
Arab Spring, the Tunisian middle class found itself completely alienated from an autocratic regime 
that failed to deliver the widely advertised “economic miracle” and that placed high costs/relatively 
low fiscal benefits on an expanding middle class, while investing all its resources in close knit 
networks of patronage revolving around the President and his wife’s inner circle.  
In contrast, by definition, autocrats that allow a certain level of party competition have to cater 
to a significantly broader constituency of support, beyond a circle of elites that can be personally 
controlled. From the fiscally distributive angle, this implies that the middle class – or at least a 
segment – needs to be either incorporated in the pool of benefits, or in the decision about costs, in 
order to invest in political survival. Therefore, the executive should have incentives to be transparent 
about the costs and benefits of fiscal policies, likely to be perceived as certain or fair, that target this 
broad coalition, including the pivotal middle class. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is an illustrative example of such a strategy. The coalition 
of political support for the executive, broad enough to include political representatives of the middle 
class, often benefits from unexpectedly detailed and precise financial information, as well as from 
studies highlighting distributional consequences of budgetary allocations. In 2007, for example, out of 
eight key fiscal documents related to the annual budget, the only document produced and disseminated 
was the enacted budget that presented the actual revenue streams and spending allocations for the 
previous fiscal year. The draft consisted of two volumes of a total of 800 pages, detailing taxation and 
spending data at the agency and program levels. What is puzzling is not so much the level of fiscal 
detail, but rather the very narrow distribution and dissemination of such a document crucial for 
accountability.2 In addition to its online posting, there were no more than 200-300 hard copies 
available for the use of MPs only. This strategy of dissemination has attempted to “show the bill” or 
establish the fairness and/or certainty of the fiscal contract for the middle class as a pivotal political 
constituency, and to a lesser extent to promote general accountability through transparency for all 
citizens alike. 
 
                                                     
2 International Budget Partnership. DRC Country Report 2007, 86.  
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It follows that the fiscal transparency of policies that entail high costs and low redeemable 
benefits for the middle class will be low in personalistic regimes, since the executive is not 
accountable to it for survival. In contrast, because the middle class is incorporated in the broad 
coalition of support of regimes with limited multiparty competition, “showing the fiscal bill” of costs 
and benefits becomes important for a leader’s tenure. 
The very nature of autocracies also involves repression in addition to co-optation of 
supporters. The budget allocated for the security apparatus (i.e. the military and the secret police) is 
almost never completely revealed to legislatures, even in established democracies. Overall, one 
expects that opaqueness in terms of repressive spending in autocracies will affect positively the 
executive tenure. Nevertheless, secrecy and uncertainty regarding the true repressive capacity should 
matter to a larger extent in polities with multiparty competition, where the coalition of support is too 
broad and the potential dissenters too numerous to effectively be controlled with limited resources. 
The main hypotheses of this study articulate this theoretical reasoning. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The transparency of fiscal policies favorable or directly relevant to broad coalitions of 
elites in multiparty autocracies including the middle class – property taxes, income and capital taxes, 
and public sector wages – should extend the leader’s political tenure. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In one-party and personalist regimes, the transparency of fiscal policies that are not 
perceived as significantly benefiting the pivotal middle class beyond a narrow elite circle are likely to 
reduce political survival.   
 
Hypothesis 3: Secret expenditure, such as military and police program allocations, under limited 
multiparty competition regimes is likely to be non-transparent. One-party regimes are less constrained 
by this requirement as they might want to project a repressive capacity in the absence of any 
challenger. 
 
4. Empirical testing 
 
Dependent variable  
In order to assess the survival of political leadership in non-democracies, I use a set of variables 
compiled from various databases. Despite the fact that the political economy operates with the central 
assumption of the (leader’s) goal to achieve and maintain political office, so far scarcity of data has 
impeded a direct test of the policy tools that leaders effectively employ to forge coalitions of support. 
In recent years, two comprehensive cross-national databases that record the duration of office tenure 
for leaders, and a plethora of accompanying characteristics, have rendered the empirical task possible. 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) collected a leaders-year database of leadership survival, and analyzed 
it extensively in their book The Logic of Political Survival (2003).3 The complete data cover 2960 
leaders with a mean office duration time of 4.63 years, and a median of 2.25 years, between 1800 and 
2002. I reduce the data to the period 1970-2001 to minimize missing values and in order to be able to 
analyze it in relation to fiscal and development variables of interest extracted from Government 
Finance Statistics, Word Development Indicators, Database of Political Institutions and Penn World 
Tables.  
In addition to the BBM et al. database of leadership survival, Goemans, Gleditsch and 
Chiozza (2009) have recently introduced Archigos – an updated database of political leaders. The 
authors correct some of the shortcomings of previous databases and place a heavier focus on the Prime 
Minister (rather than President or monarch) in parliamentary and semi-presidential political regimes, 
and on Presidents in presidential systems. A close comparative inspection of the two databases reveals 
some discrepancies, generated either by the systematic coding rule that differs in BBM and Archigos, 
                                                     
3 ). Sources: BBM 2003: 292-3; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce  et al. « The Logic of Political Survival Data Source», 
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm, accessed February 2011.  
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or by coding error. I triangulate these data sources in order to minimize measurement error on the 
dependent variable. 
 
Independent variables 
As argued in the theoretical chapter, the independent variables of interest for this project fall into two 
major categories: fiscal transparency – or the government decision to release reliable and comparable 
data on specific types of taxes/expenditure allocations, and the actual policy choice. The latter group 
attempts to tap into the distributional consequences of fiscal policies for leadership survival, and 
operates with the reported amounts of public expenditure and taxes for a sub-sample of countries that 
do decide to disclose fiscal information (income, property taxes, total revenue, taxes on goods and 
services, health, education and social security expenditure). The data sources are conventionally used 
in cross-national political economic analyses: IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) data 
consolidated within the Quality of Government Social Policy Dataset (2012), World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 2004, and BBM et al.’s Logic of Political Survival Database (2003).  
The more difficult group of independent variables attempts to capture fiscal transparency 
across the two policy domains (tax and spending), under different regime types. Unlike the case of 
policy implementation, the operationalization of fiscal transparency is more challenging and requires 
certain speculative steps. Given that there are no available systematic data on fiscal transparency with 
a wide time series coverage, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) operationalized economic data 
transparency quite creatively. The authors assumed that the decision of governments to report, or not, 
economic data on national income and general taxation to widely used cross-national databases is 
endogenous to state capacity and political institutions. In order to test these two core hypotheses, they 
coded the availability of economic data/information on tax revenues and national income reported by 
national governments to international organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations (1 for 
available/transparent, 0 for not available). This is a quantitative proxy because transparency of 
economic and political information entails extraction, production and disclosure of such data to 
citizens and international organizations in a form that allows its immediate evaluation (Root and Nellis 
2000, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Herrera 2010). In other words, based on this classic definition of 
fiscal transparency, if the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank of country X fails to report such 
comparable data to citizens, markets and international organizations, and if weak state capacity 
proxied by low GDP per capita is not the main culprit, one can safely assume a strategic logic of 
information obfuscation. 
After creating two transparency variables (for Taxation and Income), BBM et al. tested the 
hypotheses and found that indeed, overall, even when controlling for state capacity, non-democratic 
governments are less likely to be transparent about their taxation and economic data than their 
democratic counterparts. In sync with their initial intuitions, leaders in certain regimes find it 
politically easy not to report key fiscal information at all, even if the information exists and is 
somewhat reliable for internal purposes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 182-184).  
In a similar vein, Herrera (2010) analyzed cross-national variation in the adoption of the 
international System of National Accounts (SNA). As the most important global convention for 
comparable economic data across states and the conceptual-methodological basis for GDP 
computations, its adoption by national governments, Herrera argues, should have been prompt and 
relatively easy to achieve.4  However, dramatic variation in national implementation outcomes asks for 
a political-economic explanation. After testing alternative independent variables, the author concluded 
that, even when controlling for structural factors such as income and state capacity, the political 
bureaucratic willingness to comply with the new SNA standards was instrumental for increased data 
transparency in the post-Soviet states. More recently, Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (2011, 2013) 
generated two sophisticated extensions of these indicators: first, by coding the share of credible data 
reported by governments across a large number of macroeconomic indicators published by the World 
                                                     
4 At the time of writing (2009), the author reported that approximately 191 states adhered to the convention and attempted to 
implement the accounting standards to different degrees.  
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Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Second, a more advanced indicator of transparency (HRV) 
aggregates scores of missigness based on an item response model.  
I work with a similar theoretical logic and expand the transparency variable set to cover the 
relevant dimensions of fiscal policy – specific tax and spending categories. I construct two sets of 
dummy variables recording “missingness” in the GFS data, one for the expenditure group, and one for 
taxation.5 If some dimensions of fiscal transparency are indeed key to leaders’ political survival, as 
previously argued, we should observe that the probability of tenure is significantly and substantively 
affected by the availability of reliable fiscal information when controlled for other contingencies.   In 
order to create the fiscal transparency variables, I use the following coding scheme (see Table 1). 
Interestingly, as Table 1 and Figure 1 suggest, identifying consistent patterns of fiscal 
reporting to international databases is not a completely trivial exercise. There are significant 
discrepancies between various international databases collecting fiscal data (in this case IMF 
Government Finance Statistics and World Development Indicators). The earlier set of fiscal data 
reported in World Development Indicators conform to definitions and guidelines in the IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics (GFSM) manual of 1986. The current set of data is based on the 
definitions and guidelines in GFSM 2001 manual methodology.6 One of the main differences between 
the two methods is that the earlier 1986 method is a cash-based method (transactions are recorded 
whenever they take place), whereas the 2001 method is based on accrual accounting (transactions are 
recorded when they are contracted, independently of attached payment). Despite the seemingly 
technical appearance, the change in the accounting guidelines for national accounts has a major impact 
on fiscal data. For example, because of the new methodology, tax and spending arrears are now 
recorded systematically for the first time.  
Although speculatively stated at this point, it is possible that some of the IMF GFS data in 
2001 have already been reclassified according to the new format, whereas in some cases, data that 
could not be reconciled has been removed.  Independently of the sources of discrepancies in fiscal data 
reporting, there are significant differences across the two databases (WDI and GFS), therefore 
robustness checks should take into consideration both measures of expenditure and taxation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 Justification: GFS are data compiled by the IMF, based on country credible self-reporting. Therefore, the silences in the 
data have their own political history. The problems might stem from the two informational strategies states can employ: 
not reporting national statistics at all, or reporting them inaccurately, inflating developmental “achievements” or 
artificially reducing deviations from positive results. The first strategy is the easiest to capture. The second has a 
disciplinary history of its own, unlikely to be captured by IMF compiled statistics (for example, the pre 1994 efforts to 
measure and understand the economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern European states). Luckily for the current project, 
the polities whose indicators need reconstruction for comparative purposes are also autocracies. Therefore, the 
dichotomous variable of transparency I constructed will just record missing fiscal data as 0, avoiding the complicated 
debate on data quality and correctives.    
6 The IMF changed the Guideline Manual of Rules in 2001, making comparison across time more challenging. Whereas the 
IMF advises caution in terms of longitudinal and/or cross-national comparison across the 1989 threshold (the year when 
the accounting rules changed), several political economic analyses have used the entire 1972-1999/2001 period as the 
only time series data available on types of taxes and categories of public spending. Unfortunately for researchers 
interested in time series analyses, the WDI collection confines its reporting on types of taxes and spending from 1990 to 
date. Therefore, the expanded (albeit not fully comparable) 1972-1999 dataset has become a collector’s item. This study 
uses it from the Quality of Governance data source (Teorell et al. 2009). 
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Table 1: Information availability on taxes and expenditure (as proxy for fiscal transparency) 
Fiscal indicators reported in 
the IMF Government 
Finance Statistics7 
Missing data  (coded 
as 0) 
(% of total number of 
available observations 
(7,096) between 1972 
and 2000) 
Reported data 
(coded as 1) 
Alternative 
fiscal indicators 
reported in the 
World 
Development 
Indicators 20018 
(coded as 1) 
  Expenditure    
Total government 
expenditure 
(% GDP) 
 
62.91% 
 
37.09%  
 
46.14% 
Education expenditure 
(%GDP) 
68.74% 31.26% 56.88% 
Health expenditure 
(% GDP) 
68.83% 31.17% 22.76% 
Social security and welfare 
expenditure (% GDP) 
70.17% 29.83%  
Public spending on housing 
and community amenities 
(%GDP) 
70.01% 29.99%  
Government expenditure on 
wages, salaries and 
employers’ contributions 
(%GDP) 
68.36% 31.64%  
Expenditure on employers’ 
contributions 
(%GDP) 
68.74% 31.26%  
 
    
Fiscal indicators reported in 
the IMF Government 
Finance Statistics9 
Missing data  (coded 
as 0) 
(% of total number of 
available observations 
(7,096) between 1972 
and 2000) 
Reported data 
(coded as 1) 
Alternative 
fiscal indicators 
reported in the 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
200110 (coded as 
1) 
Revenue    
Total government revenue 
(% GDP) 
62.74% 37.26% 38.52% 
Taxes on income, profits, 63.78% 36.22% 46.04% 
                                                     
7 Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein. 2009. The Quality of Government 
Dataset, version 17 June 09. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se. 
8 After 2001, World Development Indicators stopped recording GFS tax and spending data prior to 1990 because of the 
GFSM transition to the 2001 rules, based on accrual accounting rather than cash.  
9 Source: Teorell et al. (2009). 
10 After 2001, World Development Indicators stopped recording GFS tax and spending data prior to 1990 because of the 
GFSM transition to the 2001 rules, based on accrual accounting rather than cash.  
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in one party and personalist political regimes depend on the politics of fiscal transparency, as opening 
up information would reveal a skewed social contract and provoke unwanted contestation from a 
middle class that does not share the fiscal advantages enjoyed by the narrow coalition of support for 
the leader. Table 3  shows that executives in these highly repressive autocracies are particularly 
vulnerable to information availability and transparency on social security contributions, as well as on 
social security and welfare expenditure and consumption taxes – policies that affect mostly the middle 
class, incorporated into the formal sector of the economy.  The statistical effect of these variables is 
large. If the executive were to publicize reliable and accurate information on social security and 
consumption taxes, and thus reveal an unfair or uncertain distributive tax burden affecting mostly the 
middle class, then the leader’s time in office is likely to be reduced by almost half.  
Additionally, for the relatively few one-party regimes that decide to be transparent on this 
fiscal category, for every 1% increase in social security contributions, the political hazard of being 
deposed increases on average with about 9%. Only education as a public good, from which arguably 
broad segments of the population, including middle class segments, can benefit, would have a 
politically positive effect for the autocratic government if transparent. In fact, this strategy extends the 
political tenure of the executive by around 25%, a substantial proxy for an “autocratic” form of 
accountability. Autocratic leaders in highly repressive regimes are thus “rewarded” politically if they 
provide some modicum of public goods, but punished if they report a skewed fiscal contract that puts 
the tax burden on the middle class active in the formal sector for the benefits of a narrow circle of 
elites. 
In contrast, table 4 shows that the availability of certain types of fiscal data in regimes with 
limited multiparty competition decreases the probability of losing office for the executive. For 
example, if the government decides to publish detailed data on its property taxation policies and 
outcomes, this decrease reaches up to 30% of the political tenure duration. To realize the large 
magnitude of these coefficient, just imagine a Prime Minister or President who has been in office for 
eight years. Opening up transparency on taxation policies affecting the broader coalition of support 
would extend, according to our results and ecological fallacies aside, her tenure for about 2.4 years.  
The findings are also significant and of an even larger magnitude for taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains, and consumption taxes when the tests are performed on the subsample of military 
multiparty regimes (a close to 73% decrease in the political hazard ratio). Interestingly, whereas 
different tax categories are statistically significant, expenditure policies seem to be slightly more 
conservative, as the only key significant category is the availability and transparency of data on wages, 
salaries and employers’ contributions. Opening this category up for public scrutiny decreases, on 
average, political hazard by about 69%. The figure below illustrates the gap between lack of 
transparency on public sector wages (value 0, blue line) and transparency and data availability (value 
1, red line): 
 
 
Figure 3: Transparency of data on public sector salaries, wages and employers’ contributions in 
regimes with limited multiparty competition 
 
The interpretation of this category of spending is relatively straightforward. In limited multiparty 
regimes, there are perhaps no better direct and tangible benefits for the middle class  than public sector 
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jobs and the rents attached to them. Availability of data and claims making with regard to this 
spending category allow the executive to signal the potential rents that the s/he is willing to share with 
the broad coalition of support deciding whether to invest in regime survival  (for example, salaries of 
MPs, of military and security personnel, SOEs, public sector employees, etc.). 
Interestingly enough, and in line with our theoretical expectations, the actual implementation 
of spending on public sector wages does not matter as much as does transparency by itself. A test of 
the actual increase in the amount of spending allocated to public wages finds no evidence. Simply put, 
it does not even matter if the executive increases or decreases the amount as long as there is 
transparency and claims making on this spending chapter. Moreover, in the case of military multiparty 
regimes (Table 4), the survival impact of increased transparency and information availability on total 
revenue, expenditure, public wages and property taxes increases dramatically. Here is a graphic 
illustration of the huge magnitude of this fiscal effect (red means information availability, value 1, 
blue means lack thereof): 
 
 
Figure 4: Transparency of data on property taxes in limited multiparty competition regimes 
 
Repression also becomes significant, but its effect is exceeded by the fiscal contract. Finally, 
Hypothesis 3 argued that military expenditure is of particular interest in non-democratic regimes. First, 
broader political coalitions incorporated in authoritarian institutions coordinate more effectively than 
groups in one-party and personalistic regimes and can impose constraints on the repressive resources 
of the executive. Second, in autocratic contexts, the privileges of military and police employees 
usually exceed those targeting civilian public sector workers. Both reasons render the transparency of 
repressive expenditure counterproductive for executives in polities with limited multiparty 
competition, as it would reveal either an unfair distribution of fiscal costs and benefits across 
military/civilian segments of the middle class, or the full repressive potential of the incumbent. Table 
4 shows that indeed, the hazard of deposal in hybrid regimes increases with about 56% when the 
executive is transparent about military expenditure. This variable is non-significant in the case of one-
party and personalist rule. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the strategic choices autocratic executives have in terms of the transparency 
of fiscal contracts. Overall, in regimes with limited multiparty competition, leaders are likely to reduce 
the danger of being deposed if they are more transparent about revenue and expenditure data directly 
relevant to the broader coalition of support including the middle class (public wages and salaries, 
income and consumption taxes). The results hold particularly well in the subtype of military regimes 
which allow some level of party competition.  The case of one-party and personalistic regimes features 
the opposite finding. Transparency of policies that reveal unfair or uncertain fiscal contracts shorten 
the leader’s duration in office. 
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The findings have three main implications. First, even in the absence of free and fair elections, 
non-democratic politicians have to be somewhat accountable to crucial constituencies in order to stay 
in power. The transparency of the fiscal contract between pivotal groups and the executive 
intermediates this relationship of autocratic accountability. Second, the autocrats’ incentives to be 
transparent or not depend on the type of fiscal costs and benefits revealed. Ratios of benefits to costs 
perceived as either unfair or uncertain by pivotal political constituencies tend to be opaque, whereas 
certain and fair fiscal contracts are likely to be more transparent. Finally, the paper argued that the 
middle class is the most important group for accountability incentives in non-democratic regimes, as 
leaders attempt to foster and maintain its political support.  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Table 2: Survival and transparency in one-party and personalist regimes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
One-party and personalist regimes Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival
GDP per capita (log) ‐0.0572 ‐0.118 ‐0.141 ‐0.121 ‐0.0475 ‐0.0443 ‐0.00573
(‐0.55) (‐1.10) (‐1.19) (‐1.09) (‐0.45) (‐0.41) (‐0.06)
Population (log) 0.127 0.130 0.0899 0.130 0.127 0.126 0.133*
(1.62) (1.64) (1.10) (1.63) (1.61) (1.61) (1.71)
Repression proxy 0.101 0.0940 0.109 0.0997 0.112 0.106 0.119*
(1.40) (1.27) (1.49) (1.35) (1.55) (1.47) (1.66)
Education expenditure 0.345
Transparency (1.53)
Social security and welfare 0.695***
Transparency (3.13)
Social security contributions 0.654***
Transparency (2.64)
Taxes on goods and services 0.577**
Transparency (2.53)
Property taxes  0.235
Transparency (1.05)
Taxes on income, profits, capital gains 0.197
Transparency (0.87)
Military expenditure ‐0.159
Transparency (‐0.73)
_cons ‐3.765*** ‐3.559** ‐2.773* ‐3.547** ‐3.825*** ‐3.806*** ‐4.072***
(‐2.67) (‐2.52) (‐1.88) (‐2.51) (‐2.68) (‐2.68) (‐2.89)
ln_p
_cons ‐0.288*** ‐0.278*** ‐0.266*** ‐0.284*** ‐0.290*** ‐0.290*** ‐0.288***
(‐3.34) (‐3.28) (‐3.10) (‐3.30) (‐3.35) (‐3.35) (‐3.32)
N 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 3: Transparency and fiscal choices in one party and personalist regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One-party and personalist regimes Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival Exec survival
GDP per capita (log) 0.0459 ‐0.0381 ‐0.132 0.137 0.170 0.0995
(0.29) (‐0.21) (‐0.39) (0.85) (0.65) (0.57)
Population (log) 0.0159 ‐0.0183 ‐0.129 0.0157 ‐0.0277 0.0922
(0.12) (‐0.13) (‐0.60) (0.12) (‐0.15) (0.68)
Repression proxy 0.156 0.0442 0.259* ‐0.00463 0.188 0.108
(1.30) (0.37) (1.84) (‐0.04) (1.28) (0.87)
Education expenditure ‐0.279***
% of GDP (‐2.65)
Social security and welfare 0.0891**
% of GDP (2.44)
Social security contributions 0.0882*
% of GDP (1.90)
Taxes on goods and services 0.0448
% of GDP (1.30)
Property taxes  ‐0.467
% of GDP (‐0.99)
Taxes on income, profits, capital gains 0.00177
% of GDP (0.04)
_cons ‐1.927 ‐1.224 0.393 ‐2.865 ‐2.920 ‐4.301*
(‐0.86) (‐0.55) (0.15) (‐1.38) (‐1.14) (‐1.94)
ln_p
_cons ‐0.122 ‐0.250** ‐0.128 ‐0.312*** ‐0.170 ‐0.192
(‐0.94) (‐2.14) (‐1.01) (‐2.71) (‐1.26) (‐1.46)
N 353 356 285 462 404 452
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Autocratic Accountability 
17 
 
Table 4: Survival and transparency in autocratic regimes with limited multiparty 
competition 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Limited party competition regimes Exec survival Exec survival* Exec survival* Exec survival Exec survival* Exec survival
GDP per capita (log) ‐0.0312 ‐0.0201 ‐0.00393 0.00942 ‐0.00393 ‐0.0172
(‐0.32) (‐0.07) (‐0.01) (0.10) (‐0.01) (‐0.19)
Population (log) ‐0.0431 ‐0.157 ‐0.171 ‐0.0288 ‐0.171 ‐0.0656
(‐0.72) (‐0.98) (‐1.07) (‐0.49) (‐1.07) (‐1.11)
Repression proxy 0.110 0.222 0.226 0.107 0.226 0.135*
(1.51) (1.21) (1.25) (1.47) (1.25) (1.84)
Education expenditure ‐0.0898
Transparency (‐0.46)
Wages and salaries ‐1.183**
Transparency (‐2.10)
Taxes on goods and services ‐1.285**
Transparency (‐2.32)
Property taxes  ‐0.357*
Transparency (‐1.79)
Taxes on income, profits, capital gain ‐1.285**
Transparency (‐2.32)
Military expenditure 0.449**
Transparency (2.45)
_cons ‐0.523 0.388 0.539 ‐0.938 0.539 ‐0.652
(‐0.46) (0.12) (0.17) (‐0.84) (0.17) (‐0.59)
ln_p
_cons ‐0.434*** 0.0573 0.0635 ‐0.422*** 0.0635 ‐0.431***
(‐6.11) (0.30) (0.34) (‐5.95) (0.34) (‐6.10)
N 978 143 143 978 143 978
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
*Exec survival indicates military multiparty competition regimes

  
 
